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The Third Plenum of the 18
th CPC Central Committee that closed last
November promised to “comprehensively deepen reforms” and intro-
duced a number of measures that seek to expand the role of the mar-
ket in the economy. (1) One of the key reform areas is land – a major source
of social unrest in China – on which Chinese leaders have reiterated the
promise of giving more property rights to farmers while granting them more
freedom to transfer, rent out, or mortgage collectively-owned rural land on
the market. 
Does this signify the official beginning of China’s new rural land reform?
This article seeks to understand why the Chinese authorities are undertaking
such reforms to address various land-related issues, and also to evaluate
how progressive they are when compared to other land transfer experiments
that have already been taking place in different parts of China. It argues
that while the Third Plenum reforms point in the direction of reducing state
monopoly on rural land transfer and restoring land use rights to farmers,
they are nothing very new. More importantly, these reforms cannot enjoy
much success unless more drastic reforms are undertaken. Such reforms in-
clude reconfiguring the power relations between local governments and
farmers in a way that owners of collective land will truly secure their land-
use rights, as well as a thorough fiscal and tax reform that reduces the re-
liance of local government on land sales. 
Allowing the free transfer of rural
construction land for commercial purposes
To some, the Third Plenum has taken an important step forward in reform-
ing the rural land tenure system. Among these measures, the most signifi-
cant is the marketisation of rural construction land, which denotes
collectively-owned rural land for non-agricultural use. In China, urban land
is state-owned while rural land is generally collectively owned. Rural land is
mainly divided into farmland and rural construction land (see Graph 1). The
former operates under the household responsibility system, which was
adopted in the early 1980s as the cornerstone of economic reforms, under
which collectively-owned farms could be entrusted to individual farming
households through long-term contracts that could in turn be leased out
to other households. The transfer of rural construction land, on the other
hand, has been strictly controlled. The Third Plenum resolution now promises
to “build a unified market for both urban and rural construction land,” a
tone that removes the hesitation in the Third Plenum five years ago, when
the official line was to “gradually” bring about unification. (2) This means that
the transfer of rural construction land will no longer be restricted. Farmers,
on the condition that the scale of farmland remains unchanged, will be able
to transfer, rent out, and mortgage their land-use rights of rural construction
land to anyone, or turn the rights into shares in large-scale farming entities
– in theory, at least. 
Full market transaction, however, only applies to rural construction land
for commercial purposes (jingyingxing jianshe yongdi 经营性建设用地).
While the reform of the rural construction land for residential housing (zhai-
jidi 宅基地), where farmers build their homes, also appeared in the resolu-
tion, it was marked by a much more cautious tone. The resolution only vows
to “carefully and properly promote collateralisation, guarantee, and transfer
of rural housing to increase farmers’ asset revenues in a few pilot regions.”
In these regions, farmers will be allowed to transfer their housing plots
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Graph 1 – Rural Land Tenure System





















through the property market. However, unlike the reform for commercial
land, the extent of rollout for residential housing will be much more limited,
while accompanied by stricter requirements. One possible reason for the
Party’s caution in allowing the full marketisation of rural residential housing
has to do with the massive amount of land it would otherwise make avail-
able. According to the Ministry of Land and Resources, such land is esti-
mated at 200 million mu across China by 2010, four times the amount of
rural commercial land, which is at 50 million mu. (3) If the full marketisation
of the former type of land is also allowed, the four-fold increase in land sup-
ply will not only be extremely difficult to administer, but will also be detri-
mental to housing prices as well as local governments’ revenue from land
sales. 
Reducing land grabs and maintaining the
household responsibility system
The resolution also proposed some other reforms that are less novel,
however. One is to tackle the problem of land expropriation, which has
been a major cause of social unrest in rural China, by reducing the scope
of land grabs by local governments and by standardising the expropriation
procedures. Nonetheless, the same thing was said five years ago during
the Third Plenum, and it did not bring about a substantial reduction in
land grabs, which often leave farmers landless and poorly compensated.
Meanwhile, no substantial change was made with regard to the ownership
and transfer of farmland in the Third Plenum, except that farmers are now
allowed to use their land as collateral in exchange for bank loans on the
condition that the collective ownership and use of the land remain un-
changed, in addition to the existing right to collectively own, use, profit
from, and transfer contracted land. The idea is to promote the develop-
ment of modern agriculture through the consolidation of farm leases
under larger, more efficient farms, a policy continued since the previous
Third Plenum under the Hu-Wen administration, which focused heavily
on rural issues. (4)
Such emphasis is reinforced by the 2014 No. 1 Central Document
(zhongyang yihao wenjian 中央一号文件), unveiled by the CCP Central
Committee and State Council in January 2014, two months after the Third
Plenum. (5) The document, released annually and typically focusing on rural
issues, places greater focus on improving the quality of agricultural pro-
duction and ensuring food safety, as pollution and contaminated farm
produce are becoming pressing national concerns. While such reform
might result in more productive farms with larger economies of scale, it
continues to affirm the household responsibility system as the backbone
policy for farmlands and strictly forbids their change of purpose from agri-
cultural use, the reason being the protection of the 18 billion mu arable
land “red line” for stable food supply and for migrant workers to return
to. But the problem about whether to keep the household responsibility
system as such or whether to adopt a system that moves closer to private
ownership (i.e., giving farmers the right to sell their farmland) has given
rise to an on-going debate between Chinese scholars. (6) Some hold that
the government should allow farmers to sell their rights so as to prevent
local officials from expropriating land from farmers without just compen-
sation. (7) Others reject the privatisation of rural land, arguing that it would
lead to a monopoly of rural land by a small number of landlords as well
as massive social turmoil due to large-scale annexation of farmland. (8)
Some of them even raised reservations about the idea of modernising
agriculture through encouraging larger farms without having to change
the household responsibility system drastically. They argue that such re-
form has led to the invasion of capital into farms, causing de facto pri-
vatisation, which forces farmers out of capital-intensive and more
profitable agriculturally-related businesses and leaves them little option
other than to be “proletarianised” as migrant workers. (9)
Land grabs as a major source of social unrest
Despite the overall cautiousness of the land reforms in the resolution, the
decision to allow the marketisation of rural construction land already shows
that Chinese leaders have decided to take a concrete step to reform the rural
land tenure system. Land reform is needed as an urgent remedy to quell rising
social discontent caused by land-related issues. In the past two decades, land
has been a major – if not the most important – source of social unrest in all
parts of China. According to an estimate given by rural expert Yu Jianrong
from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 65% of social disturbances in
China’s countryside involved disputes over land. (10) Around 43% of villages
surveyed across China reported having been victims of land grabs in the past
decade. (11) Chinese officials estimated that from the mid-1990s to mid-
2000s, 40 million Chinese peasants were affected, among whom 60% faced
“immense difficulties in life” (shenghuo kunnan 生活困难). (12)
It is thus clear that rampant land expropriation is the biggest driver behind
massive social unrest. But why have land grabs become a norm in the Chi-
nese countryside? One explanation for this phenomenon is the dynamics of
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local financing. Since the 1994 tax reforms, which recentralised fiscal power
into the hands of the central government, local governments have been
shouldering an increasing financial burden. According to data from the World
Bank, local governments, on average, are responsible for 80% of total gov-
ernment spending – including citizens’ education, health, and pensions – but
they receive only 40% of tax revenue in the form of transfers from the central
government. (13) The budgetary gap needs to be addressed through local rev-
enue sources, and it has only widened since the abolition of the agricultural
tax in 2006. To finance rising local expenditures, local officials have turned
to land sales by seizing collectively-owned rural land from farmers and selling
it to property developers for large gains. This provides a lucrative source of
income, especially as China’s housing market booms. Guan Qingyou, a Ts-
inghua University professor, estimated that land sales accounted for 74% of
local government revenue in 2010. (14) Rural land, on the other hand, can also
be used as collateral to secure bank loans in order to finance local infrastruc-
ture and bolster economic development, and this has led to a further expan-
sion of local debt, which has become a major headache for the central
government. (15) As a result, both local government budgets and borrowing
have become greatly dependent on land sales, breeding widespread collusion
between local officials, property developers, and local gangsters in expropri-
ating land from farmers. This results in violence, meagre compensation, and
persistent social unrest in the Chinese countryside. 
The key is protecting farmers’ interests in
land transfer
Hence, the key issue that land reforms ought to address is how to protect
farmers’ interests in land transfers and allow them to better exercise their
land use rights. The decision allowing farmers to transfer, rent out, or mort-
gage rural construction land for commercial purposes is thus aimed at rein-
ing in the extensive abuse of land expropriation. According to previous laws,
the central government strictly controls the ownership transfer (from col-
lective to state) of this type of land, unless the local government requires
the land for development. When the local government wants to sell a piece
of rural construction land, the collectively-owned land has to be first ac-
quired from the farmers, whom the local government must compensate.
The land must then be converted into urban construction land (nongzhuan-
fei 农转非) before being transferred to a property developer. During the land
conversion process, the local government often acts as an agent or a mid-
dleman, making it easy for local officials to pocket a large chunk of value
created by the land transfer and leave very little money to compensate the
farmers. (16)
The “new land reform” may remove this layer of complication and allow
collective owners of rural construction land to sell directly in the “unified
urban and rural construction land market” without having the local govern-
ment as its agent. This not only simplifies the land transfer process, but also
gives farmers more direct access to the land market, thus allowing them to
negotiate directly with developers for the true value of the land and en-
abling them to get a fairer compensation from the transaction. 
Another potential benefit of this “new land reform” is to lubricate the
process of urbanisation. Over the past decade, the Chinese government has
embarked on an ambitious program to urbanise China. Over 50% of China’s
population now lives in urban areas, but less than 35% have an urban
household registration (hukou). (17) Without a formal urban status, rural mi-
grants are not eligible for the welfare and housing benefits otherwise en-
joyed by urban citizens. Meanwhile, although many of them are entitled to
rental income from leasing their farm plots, existing laws do not allow them
to sell or rent out their non-agricultural rural land, even though a consider-
able portion of such land has been abandoned after farmers have moved
from rural areas to seek jobs in cities. This becomes a disincentive for rural
migrants to reside in cities permanently, and forms an obstacle to the ur-
banisation drive. Now, the “new land reform” allows farmers to cash in on
the value of rural construction land. Land transfer will give them a consid-
erable sum of asset wealth as they become urban residents, which will en-
able them to afford the often expensive living and housing costs. Rural
migrants will consequently have greater incentive to remain in cities even
in the absence of thorough hukou reform, which would give rural migrants
and urban citizens equal status and benefits, or might even dismantle the
division between urban and rural household registration. Such reform, how-
ever, is met with immense resistance, mostly from city governments, who
fear that giving permanent residency to rural migrants would incur huge
welfare cost. Hence, by better compensating rural migrants from land sales,
the “new land reform” not only helps postpone hukou reform, but also sup-
ports urbanisation and encourages rural migrants to spend more in cities,
buttressing the current state policy to shift the investment-driven economy
to one that is driven by domestic consumption. 
How new is new?
How new, however, is the “new land reform”? While the Third Plenum gives
official permission to the full transfer of rural commercial construction land
as well as the transfer of rural residential construction land in certain pilot
regions, experiments like these have long been taking place across China.
As early as 1996, the Suzhou municipal government had already begun the
transfer of rural construction land. Similar experiments have since prospered
in Guangdong, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Hainan Province, and experts have been
using these successful experiments to urge the central government to lift
the restriction on rural land transfer. In 2004, the State Council issued the
“Decision on Deepening Reforms and Strengthening Land Management,”
which allowed rural construction land to be transferrable according to law
if all planning requirements are fulfilled. (18) However, the decision has not
been implemented officially due to lack of an applicable land law, even
though the transfer of such land is tacitly endorsed in many regions. With
the Third Plenum resolution, the decision is now official. The “new land re-
form” is therefore new only in the sense that it finally approves the transfer
of rural construction land in the market. 
Meanwhile, some even more progressive experiments have been carried
out in various pilot regions. One notable example is the “land ticket” (dipiao
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地票) system in Chongqing and Chengdu. A “land ticket” is a type of deriva-
tive that makes rural land tradable in the stock market. The experiment was
first pioneered in Chongqing as part of the “Chongqing model” under the
then executive vice mayor Huang Qifan (now Chongqing’s mayor), a key po-
litical ally of fallen Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai, who believes that urban-
rural migration and marketisation of rural land can provide urban land for
development while increasing arable land. (19) Under this system, farmers first
create new land for agricultural use by reorganising the rural construction
land, or even by giving up their residential plots, in exchange for a right – the
dipiao – which they can sell to others, who can then use an equivalent
amount of rural land for urban development. Thus, if a property developer
wants to develop a piece of rural land, it must first acquire the corresponding
amount of dipiao through auction to certify that an equivalent area of farm-
land has been created elsewhere. The system has two principal merits: not
only does it promise 85% of the land proceeds to the farmers, which is far
above the level of compensation under land expropriation, it also allows
farmers to see the true value of land through the derivatives market. 
The dipiao system is in fact a marketised variant of the “balanced rural-
urban construction land-use scheme” (chengxiang jianshe yongdizengjian
guagou 城乡建设用地增减挂钩), which was introduced in 2006 and has
now been extended to almost every province. The scheme is designed to
free up rural construction land, converting part into farmland and the rest
into land for urban development. However, the scheme is more conservative
than the dipiao system. First, unlike the dipiao system, it does not set up a
derivatives market to trade land use rights, but is instead administered by
the local government. Second, according to the scheme as it stands, rural
residential land is not included in the scope of transfer, although in practice
there have been many cases in which farmers are forced from their homes
to free up land for urban development. Third, land transfer under the bal-
anced land-use scheme is only allowed to take place in a small territory,
usually within a county or the precinct of a specific development project,
whereas the dipiao system allows land use rights to be transferrable within
the entire municipalities of Chongqing and Chengdu, because they are auc-
tioned in a derivatives market.
Some regions have piloted other progressive experiments. Whereas most
of the typical experiments are about the transfer of rural construction land
for commercial purposes, some rather experimental regions have become
trailblazers in allowing the transfer of rural residential land (zhaijidi 宅基地).
Anhui Province, where the embryo of the household responsibility system
took shape, announced last October, days before the Third Plenum, that it
would let farmers in 20 districts and counties sell the land they live on, to-
gether with collectively-owned commercial plots. (20) However, the central
government has been cautious about allowing the transfer of rural residen-
tial land on a national level, as revealed by their cautious tone in the Third
Plenum resolution. One key reason is that allowing the transfer of rural
housing might leave rural migrants with no home to return to if there is a
massive layoff, which could potentially spawn massive social unrest. That
is why the government was quick to clarify that the transfer of rural resi-
dential land in Anhui applies only to the transfer of land use rights, but not
ownership – even though it is difficult to distinguish between the two in
practical terms. But Anhui is not the only place where transfer of rural hous-
ing is possible. Even in places without official permission, it has become
common for farmers to sell rural residential land. (21) This trend has led to
drastic changes in the rural landscape and peasants’ lifestyles, such as the
regrouping of farmers in new multi-storey residential communities in rural
areas, which in fact began with Hu Jintao’s “New Socialist Village” policy. (22)
All of this shows that the land reforms revealed in the Third Plenum are
less revolutionary than they sound. What is new in the “new land reform”
is at most the official approval of the marketisation of rural construction
land, which has taken place for years. Nevertheless, this is still a milestone
in making more land available to fulfil China’s insatiable drive for urban de-
velopment. Although commercial plots only account for one fifth of the
total rural construction land, the decision to allow market transactions for
commercial plots will open up a land bank that is almost double the size of
the existing urban construction land (see Graph 2). (23) The potential looks
significant: the increased supply of land can help reduce the reliance of ur-
banisation on land expropriation, restore the property rights of farmers to
their collectively-owned rural land, and give them more reasonable com-
pensation as they give up their land and migrate to cities. In terms of pro-
tecting the interests of farmers, the Third Plenum reforms seem to be
heading in the right direction.
Two critical problems: Land financing and
farmers’ lack of representation 
Nevertheless, the “new land reform” fails to rectify two critical causes that
underpin the problem of land expropriation. The first is the over-reliance of
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local government financing on land sales. Increasing the land bank by util-
ising underused or abandoned commercial plots can temporarily ease the
pressure of forcing farmers out of farmland or housing in order to make land
available for development, but this does not change the fact that local of-
ficials, who are facing huge pressure in cultivating new revenue sources,
have to rely on land sales to finance spending and secure loans for local
governments, where at the same time they can find lucrative rent-seeking
opportunities to pocket gains. More crucially, because land that can be made
available for development is limited, the policy of land financing is simply
not sustainable and will eventually necessitate reforms. That is why Zhou
Tianyong, a professor at the Central Party School, has suggested shifting
the land-financing model to a tax-based system under which local govern-
ments can receive tax from the transaction of land-use rights. (24) That
would, however, entail nationalising all rural collective land (both farmland
and constructive land included) and granting long-term leases to farmers,
just like the urban land tenure system where all land is state-owned. Radical
as it may sound, this will be a more genuine land reform than merely al-
lowing the transfer of rural construction land without overhauling the land
financing system. Predictably, however, such drastic reform will be staunchly
resisted by local governments, as it will lead to their immediate and massive
loss of revenue from rural land conversion. The limited extent of fiscal and
tax reforms revealed in the Third Plenum further confirmed such difficulties.
While local governments will now be allowed to issue bonds to finance their
expenditures, no other fiscal or tax measures were proposed to reduce their
reliance on land financing.
Closely tied to land financing is a more fundamental problem that greatly
curtails farmers’ claim to collective-owned rural land: the power imbalance
between local governments and the collective owners of rural land. In the-
ory, rural land is collectively owned by farmers. But in practice, it is con-
trolled by the Party secretary or the village chief, who often act in the name
of the village collective or the township and village enterprises (TVEs). These
village officials thus make decisions over rural land, including the leasing of
land-use rights or even sale of land to property developers. This leads to a
situation in which farmers have collective ownership over rural land but not
the actual right to exercise their ownership, and results in large gains for
the local government and officials but meagre compensation for farmers.
Such problems are especially relevant to rural construction land for com-
mercial use, which, because of its nature, is typically under the direct control
of local officials. Hence, with more rural land being made available to local
officials for transfer, there is a risk that the Third Plenum land reforms might
even exacerbate the problem of land expropriation, contrary to what is sup-
posed to be their original objective. 
The gist of the problem is therefore one of representation: China’s grass-
roots political structure lacks an organisation that truly represents the in-
terest of farmers and that allows them to translate their collective
ownership of rural land into actual decision-making power. Peasants asso-
ciations (nonghui), which re-emerged in China during the 1990s and were
later formally regulated under the Law on Peasants’ Specialized Cooperatives
(promulgated in 2006), are now present in 85% of villages across China and
can potentially play a stronger role in representing the farmers. But they
have been marginal in rural affairs – and many “exist in name only,” accord-
ing to an observer. (25) There have been other successful experiments, how-
ever. In Guangdong Province, the representation problem is partly resolved
by the adoption of a different collective ownership system. Rural commu-
nities in some parts of Guangdong have retained ownership of their land
when they are developed into urban neighbourhoods or industrial zones by
converting the rural collectives into property companies. Although such
property companies are often placed under the leadership of village officials,
the fact that villagers are turned into shareholders of the companies prop-
erly entitles them to dividends and rent from land conversion and enables
them to become a propertied class. (26)
The shareholding practice in Guangdong nevertheless seems to be more
an exception than the rule. In most parts of China, the control of rural col-
lectives still falls into the hands of local governments. After all, it might not
be that feasible to emulate the Guangdong model in regions where the local
economy is less developed and less marketised. And more fundamentally,
the power imbalance is not only caused by the collective ownership system;
it is also due to the fact that individual farmers’ ownership of collectively-
owned rural land is often unclear. Collective ownership exists in theory, but
few farmers have ownership certificates to demarcate their ownership
claims, including what they own and how much they own. The central gov-
ernment in fact began to rectify this problem long before the Third Plenum.
The 2010 No. 1 Central Document emphasised for the first time the urgent
need to register land ownership and land-use rights for farmland, commer-
cial construction land, and residential land. A policy document on rural is-
sues announced in early 2013 required that by the end of 2017, farmers
should be given ownership certificates for their farmland, and that certifi-
cates for rural housing should be issued “as soon as possible.” (27) Without
the clear demarcation of ownership rights for farmers, the monopoly of local
governments over land transfers will persist, and the land market will not
become functional. 
Conclusion: New land reform, a false hope?
To conclude, the success of the “new land reform” depends neither on the
size of rural land made available for market transaction nor on the mode of
transaction in organising land transfer. It depends on whether local govern-
ments’ reliance on land financing can be significantly reduced, and whether
the process of land transfer can truly account for the claim of farmers’ col-
lective ownership of rural land. The former entails thorough fiscal and tax
reforms: increasing fiscal transfer to local governments and allowing them
to cultivate new revenue sources, while developing a tax-based income sys-
tem. The latter involves the reconfiguration of grassroots power relations
between local governments and farmers in order to restore farmers’ rights
to their land. Without taking these painful steps, the “new land reform” is,
at best, a false hope. 
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